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There are at least 43 separate police agencies that file charges in the 
Houston/Harris County Texas area. They are responsible, with various levels of interest, 
in criminal matters for the 3.7 million residents of the area.  Further, many of these 
agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.  Recorded critical incidents confirm confusion 
due to jurisdictional or critical events so near jurisdictional boundaries that political 
delineation blurred, sparking misunderstandings between agencies and issuing 
improper response with confusion to the constituents who needed immediate 
assistance.  Using existing research, this paper addresses the tendency of concurrent 
jurisdictions to have a lack of coordination management, communication, and 
clarification as to which agency has full accountability to critical incidents.   It presents 
an argument that the contemporary management paradigm in responding to a critical 
incident in concurrent police jurisdictions should be changed to ensure accountability 
and provide the best police service to the community.  The paper delivers an 
information technology based alternative to current methodology of police deployment 
to critical incidents in concurrent jurisdictions.  It concludes that any alternative police 
management paradigm will not easily be accepted among Texas law enforcement 
agencies.  It further recommends moving forward with more study and discussion for 
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There are at least 43 separate police agencies that file charges in the 
Houston/Harris County Texas area Harris County District Attorney’s Office (2008).  They 
are responsible, with various levels of interest, in criminal matters for the 3.7 million 
residents in the area.  Many of these agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.  Concurrent 
jurisdiction exists for several reasons.  Some exist because of the development of 
specialized police agencies created for a particular entity, such as a university police 
department; others exist because of political subdivisions within the jurisdictional 
boundaries of existing political subdivisions (e.g. city, constable offices within a county) 
or legislative creation such as a transit police department.  Most of these specialized 
entities have generally recognizable boundaries that, for the most part, delineate where 
one jurisdiction ends and another begins.   
However, there are recorded critical incidents so near jurisdictional boundaries 
that the political delineation becomes blurred, sparking misunderstandings between 
agencies and the constituents who need immediate assistance. The main question that 
must be asked is which agency should be notified to respond and who has full 
accountability.  It is this lack of managing coordination and communication to critical 
incidents that will be the focus of this paper.  Critical incident response in concurrent 
jurisdictions can cause an inadequate, inappropriate or, at worse, no response, if not 
properly managed.  In other words, the contemporary management paradigm in 
responding to a critical incident in concurrent police jurisdictions should be changed to 
ensure accountability.  Further, this paper will provide an alternative management 
paradigm using a police model not easily accepted among Texas law enforcement 
 2 
agencies.  Debate, if not outright dispute, is expected for this new arrangement because 
it calls for a temporary relinquishment of autonomy by responding agencies.  The 
concept may be unfamiliar to police as it has not been used in a law enforcement 
setting but has shown great promise in other area of emergency response and is 
therefore presented.   
To establish a framework for position and demonstrate the short comings of the 
current paradigm, this paper will describe five of the most prevalent departments with 
concurrent jurisdiction and how it fails in one of the most densely populated areas of 
Harris County:  downtown Houston, Texas.  Further, it will discuss why this paradigm 
exists and its origins.  The alternative model will then be presented using the same 
agencies and context for comparison to existing model.   
POSITION 
The current model is an unwise use of tax payer capital during a critical incident.  
Much of the problem is caused by stagnation of the current police service delivery 
model.  It is a legacy police paradigm with roots in Sir Peel’s geographical structure 
(Etter, 2001) and serves as an excellent analogy for today’s paradigm.  In this model, 
each officer is accountable for his area or “beat” (jurisdictional boundary).  The idea 
being only one officer (agency) is accountable for one “beat” (jurisdictional boundary).  
Consequently, imagine five of Peel’s officers assigned the same “beat.”  The 
comparison in modern day Houston is that each agency (analogous to Peel’s officer) 
has a concurrent “beat” with another agency (the other four of Peel’s officers).  Sir Peel 
would have needed to coordinate which officer was accountable to an event to which all 
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had been called.  If not, there would be a replication of effort by a factor of five as well 
as an inefficient management of police service.   
The current approach to concurrent jurisdictional law enforcement service 
delivery is identical to Sir Peel’s paradigm and one with a great potential for a failure in 
police service delivery during a critical event.  As mentioned, five prevalent agencies in 
the downtown Houston area have concurrent jurisdiction.  Each of the five jurisdictions 
has an individual tax base with distinct “jurisdictional boundaries,” and all five could 
receive a call to respond to a specific critical incident wholly within their jurisdiction and 
that of another.  With the overlap in jurisdiction, the public reporting a critical incident via 
911 and/or directly to police agencies via a call for service infrastructure to each agency 
can cause a confused and inappropriate response.  Further, the law enforcement 
agencies themselves may also become confused as to why other agencies may be on 
scene for “their” call further exacerbating a convoluted response. 
To illustrate, the intersection of Main Street and Commerce Street, Houston, 
Texas is just outside the University of Houston-Downtown doors.  The location 
technically falls within the primary jurisdiction of the Houston Police Department.  
However, it is possible that other agencies with concurrent jurisdiction could lay claim to 
an incident or, worse, could all be called to deliver police services to the location via 
their individual agency’s communication infrastructure.  This is simply because of 
concurrent jurisdiction or the incident’s proximity to jurisdictional boundaries that the 
incident could easily be confused as to be in the jurisdiction of an agency a witness has 
called directly for assistance.   As such, there is a high potential for replication of effort 
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and resources with the possibility of conflicting managerial decision making and minimal 
information sharing making first responders and civilians involved vulnerable.   
The law enforcement agencies specifically discussed in this paper to 
demonstrate current paradigm of concurrent jurisdiction police service delivery are: 
Houston Police Department, METRO Transit Police, Harris County Sheriff’s 
Department, University of Houston-Downtown Police Department and Harris County 
Constable’s Office Precinct 1.  These departments were selected because they best 
exemplify the issue of managing response to critical incidents when a critical incident 
occurs and have components originating from various locations within concurrent 
jurisdictions.  They also have the technical infrastructure in place to mitigate such 
inaccuracies in police service response. 
The seemingly illogical foundation of the local concurrent jurisdiction has been 
the allocation of specialized police departments and established Texas law.  Regardless 
of their founding statutes, all have police authority. The separate tax bases which funds 
them also inadvertently creates a system of avoidance to accepting responsibility.  This 
is the result when responding agencies, guided by elected officials, sense a sole 
obligation to their tax base and when apathy by police management to bring an incident 
to a conclusion that may not be their “jurisdiction.” 
A coordinated response of police resources to a critical incident to an area with 
multiple concurrent police service delivery agencies will mitigate redundancy and 
inappropriate response.  Further, once the critical incident becomes stable, the 
investigation can more quickly move to the appropriate agency’s investigative team or a 
multijurisdictional task force may be implemented to complete an inquiry.  Additionally, 
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when the public is in a crisis, they are unaware of jurisdictional boundaries or agency 
specific responsibilities.  They expect the first police officer on the scene to take charge 
and act without regard to “jurisdiction.”  To further demonstrate how entrenched the 
current paradigm is, it is important to understand how the present management 
paradigm originated.  This is discussed in the next several paragraphs. 
The existing management of the aforementioned police organizations can be 
generally described as fiefdoms with little exchange of information, except material 
mandated to be officially reported to the state and to which every agency across the 
State of Texas has access.  This is evidenced in the separate hierarchical chains of 
command for each agency.  Further, each has its own dispatch system for receiving and 
disseminating calls for service within their individual jurisdiction.    
In reality, these law enforcement entities are legally established and politically 
based institutions.  This model of governance necessarily entails elected officials who at 
minimum influence or appoint police/law enforcement administrators, unless those 
police/law enforcement administrators are themselves elected officials.  This leads to 
concurrent jurisdictions regarding themselves as autonomous and self-serving despite 
the fact they have a geographical relationship with other agencies.  Miller stated that 
elected officials tend to sustain support for their office to the determinate of utilitarian 
requirements of all who reside in their area (as cited in Matkin & Frederickson, 2009).  
To be fair, most agencies accept the fact there is “concurrent” jurisdiction and it is an 
impetus for a paucity of cooperation.  This is evidenced by the existence of 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between some of the agencies such as 
between the City of Houston Police department and METRO Transit Police (METRO 
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Police, 2010).  The fact that not all have a MOU with one another is indicative of further 
fragmentation.  However, existing agreements fall short of the need to create an 
organization with governance over all parties involved.  This is illustrated by MOUs 
limiting responsibility by only documenting a shared commitment to specific roles of 
each entity as needed (Andrew, 2009).  
In order to mitigate confusion and perhaps instill synergy, police managers of all 
Harris County-Houston area agencies must re-think and re-engineer their delivery of 
police service delivery model to one which allows creation of ad hoc teams managed by 
a virtual police management organization (VMPO).  The VMPO would be specific to 
management of police service delivery during critical incidents, which contain multiple 
components affecting two or more agency separately.  Similar to response to natural or 
manmade disasters, managing a response of this nature, if not coordinated, would 
become a part of the problem (Auf der Heide, 1989).  As the incident becomes known, 
there is a risk of redundancy and/or deployment of inappropriate resources.  The ability 
to coordinate response to critical events within concurrent jurisdictional boundaries 
would enhance public safety and be more fiscally responsible.  This coordinated 
response will necessitate an “incident organization”, a transitory political structure of 
separate entities (Smith & Dowell, 2000).   
The paradigm of transitory alliance calls for a management structure that can 
quickly integrate all resources available within the multijurisdictional response area.  
This is best completed by a virtual management organization.  The VPMO that is 
created will be via a cyber-centric approach.  Communications and information sharing 
would be by wireless internet technologies. This technology exists today in four of the 
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five allowing interoperability.  The lone agency not yet interoperable is the Houston 
Police Department.  However, efforts are underway to implement such interoperability 
by 2014. The intent of cyber-centric police service delivery management in the context 
of this paper would be to coordinate resources and collect and disseminate intelligence 
of a specific critical incident to which two or more police service delivery agencies have 
received calls.  To this end, the major law enforcement agencies in the Houston-Harris 
County Area should implement a virtual police critical incident response management 
paradigm to address critical incidents to be viable up and to the extent a specific agency 
clearly accepts the lead for the incident.  An outline as to how this could be 
accomplished is discussed below. 
Management concepts, such as managing technology in business, can migrate 
into public service philosophies.  The business philosophy of becoming leaner to 
improve profits is similar to the “do more with less” precepts placed on police service by 
their governing bodies today.  These cost cutting efforts have law enforcement agencies 
(LEA) looking to apply business Information Communication Technology (ICT) to help 
cut costs where ever possible.  A particularly good fit for ICT is in the management of 
multiple police organizations.  For this to occur, however, police managers must change 
or at least modify their style and focus of management to becoming more aware in 
identifying the appropriate information and communication technology application 
(Hughes & Love, 2004).  This contention is supported by Hedelin and Allwood (2002) 
when they argued that a degree of re-engineering that may include a restrained shift in 
management style within the police organization is necessary when an ICT project is 
undertaken.   
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The recent radical growth of ICT caught many LEA administrators off guard.  
When the ICT revolution started, most police organizations were simply not prepared to 
take advantage of the opportunity for better management through technology (Munro, 
1984).  ICT was seen by police managers as solely support for record keeping.  This is 
because the necessary development of police management skill and development were 
not improved to meet the requirement of ICT as a management tool beyond information 
storage (Ackroyd, 1993; Etter, 2001).  According to Munro (1984), for police managers 
to meet the challenge of ICT in police service management, three areas must be 
developed:  program budgeting, strategic planning, and ICT itself.  Due to the limited 
scope of this paper, the first two areas of budgeting and strategic planning will be 
discussed only briefly.   
Program budgeting and strategic planning may be summarized by saying that 
although funding for infrastructure and hardware have been allocated, educational 
courses concerning advanced technology for law enforcement agencies has not kept 
pace (Munro, 1984).  Thus, there is a short fall in how ICT may be recognized as a 
benefit to police personnel management.  Even with the proliferation of ICT as applied 
to information management, there has been little research into how ICT has impacted 
police organizations from a management perspective.   
However, one byproduct of business information communication technology 
(ICT) that is capable of finding its way to the attention of police managers is the concept 
of managing virtual teams.  The potential for exploitation of the virtual team concept in 
police management is great, given the availability of ICT currently in use by police. 
Technologies, such as Automated Vehicle Location (AVL), Mobile Data Terminals 
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(MDT), and Real Time Crime Analysis are now in service.  A virtual team in the 
business world is a collection of individuals working on single project but not located in 
the same geographical area.  Decisions are made based on a collaboration of individual 
ideas and information.  The collaboration and documentation is exchanged via email, 
video, or other technology supported by information technology.   
This concept would unquestionably require the support of Information 
Communication Technological enhancements in creating a virtual organization. The 
adoption of this model must necessarily have a foundation in evolving technological 
dynamics that will re-engineer and not restrain (Gordon, 2001).  In other words, the 
adoption would encourage cooperation by making it easier to complete task than to 
battle over which agency is accountable.  Law enforcement could adopt and modify the 
cyber-centric virtual team management used in today’s businesses.   
Most importantly to the focus of this paper is the transition business managers 
had to make as the old paradigm of direct supervision was no longer applicable.   This 
paper supports extending the paradigm of business virtual team management and 
applying it to law enforcement management by discussing the inter-agency possibilities.  
It will discuss in depth its application at the next level; creating virtual police 
management organizations, which are critical incident specific and involve concurrent, 
yet organizationally separate jurisdictions.  This is where the concept would be most 
effective and supports the common edict today of doing more with what the agency has, 
a zero based budget (no growth in personnel).  To this end, a shift toward a virtual 
police management organization (VMPO), complemented with modified police 
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management practices and facilities that assist appropriate delivery of traditional police 
services during a critical incident within a contemporary context is viable.    
Today, there are two facilities that have the potential to act as the hub for the 
virtual police management organizations (VPMO):  The Houston Police Real Time 
Crime Analysis Center and TranStar, both of which are technologically enhanced 
facilities.  The Houston Real Time Crime Analysis Center (RTCAC) keeps a 24/7 watch 
on all calls for service to HPD and uses Geographical Information Systems to plot 
locations of calls for service on a map as they relate geographically to resources, 
thereby allowing the RTCAC to graphically observe developing patterns and form an 
intelligence led response.  
Houston TranStar was originally designed enhance traffic mobility, and it has the 
capability to communicate with multiple agencies and is staffed by multiple police 
agencies to collectively solve traffic issues.  Modifications technologically would 
enhance its capabilities to include monitoring response to critical incidents by a 
multitude of police service delivery agencies.  The major hurdle for a VPMO is the 
acceptance of each independent agency to accept whatever entity is at the hub to direct 
and authorize decisions to any law enforcement agency resource responding to a 
critical incident.  There are also those who do not agree a VMPO could be successful. 
These counter positions are discussed in the next section. 
COUNTER POSITION 
Opponents argue that law enforcement agencies are based in politics and, as 
such, their governing elected officials will not allow their officers to be governed 
(managed) by any management entity for fear of not being able to fulfill their obligation 
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to their electorate.   They are that this may be particularly true when the agency has 
concurrent jurisdiction but the critical incident occurs in an area with its own police 
service delivery. This has been found true in other parts of the country.  In Suffolk 
County, New York, 57% of respondents to a survey (Baer, 1982) cited “limitations on 
independence of action,” as the most important reason not to enter into an inter-
jurisdictional service agreement.  The rebuttal to this perspective is possibility of 
creating a government, with only one purpose (Reynolds, 2003), known as special 
districts.  These can be formed when local political governments voluntarily act for their 
creation.  Such an entity could be the hub of the VPMO, thus adding legitimacy and 
credibility with a higher potential for allegiance, at least for the duration of a critical 
incident.  
Other opponents may argue that officers will respond and act without regard to 
jurisdiction and then work out details of critical incident as to investigatory and primary 
responsibility after the incident, thus negating the need for formal management, virtual 
or otherwise.  They would insist this is done as a matter of working in the area and of 
common practice.  There is evidence for this perspective as well.  A study by McDavid 
(1977) indicated that informal (non-written) cooperative agreements correlated with 
police performance being ranked higher than formal (written) cooperative agreements.  
However, this study along with many others (Matkin & Frederickson, 2009; Reiss, 1992; 
Andrew, 2009; Reynolds, 2003; Monge et al., 1999) focused on interagency and inter-
jurisdictional issues rather than concurrent jurisdictional concerns.  Stated another way, 
the studies involved jurisdictions that were contiguous.  This paper considers a 
jurisdiction within a jurisdiction.  Further negation to this perspective is the first 
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counterpoint.  Managers of one agency tend not to give up autonomy; therefore, there is 
a tendency to not to engage critical incidents in a concurrent jurisdiction where that 
jurisdiction has police service delivery. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Virtual management has been used in business applications for decades. A 
virtual team in the business world is collection of individuals working on single project 
but not located in the same geographical area.  Decisions are made based on ideas, 
information, and documentation that are exchanged via email, video, or other 
technology supported by information technology.  Most importantly, managers needed 
to adjust styles as the old paradigm of direct supervision was no longer applicable.     
Current management of police services is not in line to meet the future 
challenges.  Short of a complete consolidation of police departments, a very unlikely 
event, a strategic direction is needed to integrate new and emerging information 
communication technologies to make the best use of police personnel as it is dispersed 
among the several agencies of the area.  The five police departments used to exemplify 
this proposed strategy receive funding from a multitude of tax bases.  Political 
jurisdictions force the legacy model of police fiefdoms often duplicating effort and 
wasting resources. Cyber-centric police management exploiting the benefits of virtual 
police management solves both the political and technical issues facing law 
enforcement administrators.   
However, concessions and modifications of current police practices and 
management will necessarily be a part of any successful cyber-centric or virtual police 
management effort.  Technology will need to be shared both fiducially and as a function 
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of the delivery of police service.  Police officers must think for themselves about 
applying new concepts of virtual team decision-making, and first line supervisors must 
no longer see themselves in a paramilitary structure because the a virtual police 
supervisor may not be managing officers within their hierarchal structure.  Instead, 
these supervisors must see themselves as more of a conductor, providing appropriate 
decision-making feedback to field officers via socio-technical methodology to 
accomplish a common goal.  Further, there may actually be a reduction in supervision.  
If a virtual organization can be created, fewer police managers would be needed across 
jurisdictions because any deficiencies may be taken up by other partner agencies.  In 
other words, there would not be as great a need for each agency in the region to have a 
supervisor on duty as another member agency could have one that would be a “virtual” 
manager for both.  This would allow the personnel position to be pushed down to the 
level of officer on patrol and decrease response time. 
Obviously, much work will be needed to train police personnel and implement the 
ICT.  All current police personnel will need to move beyond the current level of technical 
literacy.  Law enforcement command staff will need to enhance their skill sets to be able 
to not only apply technology and adopt cyber-centric management philosophy but also 
to be able to recognize new and emerging technologies beneficial to expedient delivery 
of police service.    
This model provides an overall framework with a specific an example of 
applicability.  The broad strokes mentioned here are intended to act as a precursor to 
more detailed examination of what is possible in re-engineering police work to ensure 
that practitioners influence adoption of ICT and improve police service delivery and 
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management.   It is ironic that although little has been done in espousing virtual 
management in the police environment, systems that support such concepts have been, 
such as computers in police vehicles, advanced radio communications and 
memorandums of understanding specifying shared resources and responsibilities.  If 
law enforcement can be provided with suitable technology and the skill sets to use it, 
virtual management may very well evolve in and of itself.  This concept must be 
demonstrated and supported financially and politically by government entities.  
Partnerships between police service providers, private ICT industry, and academia are 
also essential.   
This paper makes no pretense as to the enormous challenge in dismantling the 
well-entrenched legacy system of police service delivery.  It is intended to emphasize 
the gap in police service delivery.  Further, it provides possible solutions using current 
and emerging information communication technology with an adoption of a cyber-centric 
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